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Summary: This paper covers the problems and dynamics that LGBTQI 
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer and Intersex) asylum seekers face 
when they leave their country of origin and enter countries within the 
European Union. Only a small percentage of people that claim asylum 
on the basis of reasonable fear of persecution because of sexual ori-
entation are granted asylum within these EU Member States, or some 
other form of international protection. 
The paper scans the relevant legislation that is supposed to protect 
asylum seekers in general and covers the three most important cases 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the treatment 
and assessment of asylum applications on the basis of fear of persecu-
tion because of sexual orientation. The case at hand needs to be seen 
within this general framework as we know it so far. 
F v Hungary concerns the case of a Nigerian national claiming asylum 
on the basis of fear of persecution in his country of origin because of 
his homosexuality. To determine his general credibility, the Hungari-
an determining authorities subjected F to three different psychological 
tests. However, the psychological experts could not confi rm or deny 
F’s sexual orientation based on these tests. Consequently, the deter-
mining authorities decided that his general credibility could not be 
established and his claim for asylum was denied.
The Hungarian Appeal Court requested a preliminary ruling before the 
CJEU. The Court ruled that in these cases it is not always neces-
sary to determine the sexual orientation of an applicant. The CJEU 
stressed that, when assessing an asylum application, it does not mat-
ter whether or not an applicant actually identifi es with the particular 
social group that attracts persecution. Scientifi c reports from medical, 
psychological or social experts can certainly be of value throughout the 
asylum application assessment, but determining authorities cannot 
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be bound by such expert reports. Every case should undergo an in 
concreto assessment, taking into account the individual circumstanc-
es and with respect for human dignity, the right to respect for private 
and family life, and the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by 
Articles 1, 7 and 47 of the EU Charter. Every interference with these 
rights should be in line with the proportionality principle.
Finally, some suggestions are made to shape a future strategy and 
the development of asylum application assessment.
1 Introduction
 ‘Staying alive.’ Probably the fi rst and only thing on asylum seekers’ 
minds. There is no reason to believe that this would be any different for 
gay asylum seekers. Sexual orientation appears to be the most diffi cult 
ground for asylum to prove. Often there is no material evidence, or it can-
not be relied upon, and the determining authorities are left to assess every 
case based on statements and declarations of the applicants themselves. 
These asylum seekers come from countries where they face persecution, 
social exclusion or even the death penalty. For many lesbian, gay, bisexu-
al, transgender, queer and intersex (hereafter: LGBTQI) asylum seekers, 
talking about intimate experiences and sexuality is often diffi cult and 
many of them do not mention their sexual orientation as a reason until 
late in the asylum procedure, causing the determining authorities to ques-
tion the sincerity of their statements and their general credibility. 
Dublin III entered into force in July 2013 and aims to provide proce-
dures for all Member States to protect asylum seekers and improve the 
effi ciency of the asylum application process. However, the existing legis-
lation has so far failed to provide specifi c protection and safeguards for 
LGBTQI asylum seekers. These asylum seekers are especially vulnerable 
because of social stigma, a lack of acceptance, and a general incompre-
hensive attitude in some societies. Both these asylum seekers and the 
human rights organisations representing them have become more vo-
cal about some disturbing experiences and Member States’ malpractices 
when assessing asylum applications.
Over the last few years, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter: CJEU, or the Court) has had a few opportunities to shed 
light on how asylum assessment should be conducted. In 2014, in a case 
known as A, B and C, the CJEU ruled on a preliminary reference from 
the Netherlands. The Court found that allowing evidence of homosexual 
acts from tests or fi lms would violate human dignity. The events that 
sparked the judgment were the cases of three asylum seekers whose 
requests for asylum were denied. After being rejected, they applied for 
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asylum a second time based on their fear of persecution for their sexual 
orientation in their country of origin. With their application, they pro-
vided videos of intimate acts performed on a person of the same sex or 
expressed their willingness to participate in tests or perform a homosex-
ual act to prove the truthfulness of their sexuality. All three applications 
were again dismissed for lack of credibility. The Court ruled that EU law 
precludes national authorities from accepting such evidence with the 
view of establishing the applicant’s sexuality.1 Besides the fact that such 
evidence cannot be seen as valuable to assess an asylum application, 
it is irreconcilable with human dignity as guaranteed by Article 1 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court has also recognised and 
condemned the practice of the determining authorities relying heavily 
or even solely on certain stereotypical characteristics of LGBTQI people 
and, in doing so, ignoring the individual situation and personal circum-
stances, rendering an in concreto assessment impossible. 
More recently, on 25 January 2018, the CJEU ruled on the use of 
Hungary’s psychological tests to determine asylum seekers’ sexual ori-
entation. This judgment is the topic of this case comment, and opens up 
broader discussion on the general treatment of asylum seekers across the 
European Union and discrimination based on their sexual orientation. 
This paper will focus on the use of psychological tests to determine 
the sexual orientation of asylum seekers and the CJEU’s view on the po-
tential danger of using such tests in asylum application procedures. In 
order to better analyse the meaning of the case at hand, it is important 
to fi rst consider the principles and methods that are currently used by 
Member States. 
Classically, the term ‘LGBT’ is used throughout legal literature. In 
this case comment, however, the term ‘LGBTQI’ will be used, making 
sure also that people who identify as queer or intersexual are included. I 
believe it is important to include all categories of the sexuality spectrum 
that are at risk of facing persecution in their countries of origin, since 
the protection of all these asylum seekers’ personal integrity is para-
mount and all their applications should be assessed with the same level 
of scrutiny and attention. Other categories, such as asexual people, are 
not included in the LGBTQI categorisation.
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the Court’s case 
law determining the favourable and unfavourable methods in assessing 
asylum applications based on sexual orientation. A correct and careful 
assessment of such applications ensures that due consideration is given 
1  Case C-148/13 A, B and C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie ECLI:EU:C:2014: 
2406.
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to the applicants’ rights to private life, and the personal situation and 
circumstances are taken into account. 
2. Asylum applications based on sexual orientation and their 
assessment within the European Union
2.1 General guidelines and practices
The way the determining authorities investigate and assess asylum 
applications differs among Member States. Generally, the procedure con-
sists of a two-tier investigation where, fi rstly, open questions are asked 
about the applicant’s alleged sexual orientation to establish the facts of 
the individual case. Only after that are more general questions asked to 
establish overall credibility.2 In some countries, however, applicants are 
subjected to psychological tests. Refugees who request asylum based on 
their sexual orientation need to prove three things. Firstly, that they are 
a member of an LGBTQI society. Secondly, that they fear persecution 
in their country of origin on the grounds of their sexuality. And third-
ly, that their fear is well founded. A few of these proofs are certainly an 
issue and may in some cases be a violation of human rights. Indeed, it 
was also these very issues that were brought before the Court and will 
be discussed further in this case note.  
In 2017, the UK’s Home Offi ce came under fi re after it released ex-
perimental data on the asylum outcomes of applicants coming from 
countries that are considered to be amongst the most homophobic in the 
world. It was reported that only 63 of 331 applicants from Nigeria were 
granted asylum based on their sexual orientation. Not a single applicant 
of the 82 Indian or 48 Sri Lankan applicants was granted asylum.3
Similar trends are detected in countries like the Netherlands, de-
spite its liberal and progressive tradition and mindset. Stories emerge 
about individuals being refused asylum based on their sexual orienta-
tion because they are ‘not gay enough’, because of the applicant being 
married in the past or having children and therefore not possibly being 
able to be regarded as a member of the LGBTQI community.4
2  UNHCR, ‘Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ 
(UNHCR 2011).
3  Nick Duffy, ‘The UK Has Rejected Thousands of Gay Asylum Seekers’ (Pink News, 30 
November 2017) <www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/11/30/the-uk-has-rejected-thousands-of-
gay-asylum-seekers> accessed 19 May 2018.
4  Sarah French Brennan, ‘LGBT Asylum Seekers Struggle to Find Safety − Even in a Pro-
gressive Country Like the Netherlands (Quartz, 5 July 2017) <https://qz.com/1021301/
lgbt-asylum-seekers-struggle-to-fi nd-safety-even-in-a-progressive-country-like-the-nether-
lands/> accessed 20 May 2018.
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In Belgium, asylum applications based on sexual orientation make 
up approximately 20% of all asylum claims, but only one out in fi ve ap-
plicants in this category is granted asylum or some form of international 
protection.5 
There is little reason to believe that asylum applications based on 
sexual orientation are more successful.6  An important factor cultivating 
these malpractices is that many determining authorities still rely on the 
classical stereotypes associated with LGBTQI people. Relying on the be-
haviour generally attributed to people with a certain sexual orientation 
to make legally binding decisions is as absurd as it is dangerous. Rely-
ing on the idea that the sexual orientation of an asylum seeker can only 
be taken seriously when that person demonstrates a certain behaviour 
generally associated with homosexual people means that an important 
proportion of LGBTQI asylum seekers are left out. The determining au-
thorities tend to treat asylum applications of non-effeminate gays or of 
lesbians who do not behave in a masculine way with caution. Bisexuals 
even risk being excluded from international protection completely. This 
is also the case for LGBTQI applicants who have been married in the 
past or those who have children. They face even more diffi culties proving 
their reasonable fear of persecution in their home country.  
2.2 Common European Asylum System 
Since 1999 the European Union has been trying to develop a Common 
European Asylum System (hereinafter: CEAS) and has adopted several leg-
islative measures to ensure and harmonise minimum standards for asy-
lum. Its creation developed over time and is founded on three pillars: 
i) Bringing more harmonisation to standards of protection by fur-
ther aligning the EU States’ asylum legislation;
ii) Effective and well-supported practical cooperation;
iii) Increased solidarity and a sense of responsibility between EU 
States, and between EU and non-EU countries.7
5  Commission, ‘EMN Ad-Hoc Query on NL AHQ on National Asylum Policies Regarding 
LGBT-Asylum Seekers’  available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/fi les/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-
queries/ad-hoc-queries-2016.1061_-_nl_ahq_on_national_asylum_policies_regarding_
lgbt-asylum_seekers.pdf> accessed 14 June 2018.
6  Johannes Lukas Gartner ‘(In)credibly Queer: Sexuality-based Asylum in the European 
Union’ in Anthony Chase (ed), Transatlantic Perspectives on Diplomacy and Diversity (Hu-
manity in Action Press 2015) <www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/578-in-credi-
bly-queer-sexuality-based-asylum-in-the-european-union> accessed 2 July 2018.
7  European Commission, ‘Common European Asylum System’ (European Commission, 
2 July 2018) <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en> ac-
cessed 1 July 2018.
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Even though the European Union has already adopted a multitude 
of legislation to attain these goals, no specifi c directive or regulation to 
protect LGBTQI asylum seekers or to regulate the assessment of asylum 
applications based on sexuality has been drafted. This legal gap is re-
grettable, since clarity in this domain would greatly benefi t the vulnera-
ble group of LGBTQI asylum seekers across the European Union. 
On a few points, states within the European Union fail to comply 
with the legal standards set out by both European and international 
human rights law when assessing asylum applications based on sexual 
orientation.8 AG Sharpston also remarked that neither the Procedures 
Directive, the Geneva Convention, nor the Charter provides specifi c rules 
on how the credibility of asylum seekers should be assessed.9
2.3 Outlawing the ‘discretion requirement’
It was only in 2013 that the Court rightfully banned determining 
authorities from all Member States from returning asylum claimants 
to their respective countries of origin, telling them to be ‘discreet’ about 
their sexual orientation in the X, Y and Z case.10
The Court then stated that sexual orientation asylum applicants 
need to fulfi l two criteria:
i) The social recognition test, where membership of a group socially 
recognisable in the country of origin is proven; and
ii) The fundamental characteristic test, where applicants need to 
show that the recognition of their sexual identity as a character-
istic is so fundamental to their identity that one should not have 
to renounce it.
On the same note, the Court determined that the criminalisation of 
same-sex conduct in the country of origin does not in itself constitute an 
act of persecution. The applicant needs to show a specifi c and reasonable 
fear of persecution. The principles set by the Court in this judgment are 
sometimes considered not being in line with the UNHCR guidelines and 
refl ect a strict interpretation of EU law.11
8  Sabine Jansen and Thomas Spijkerboer, Fleeing Homophobia (COC Nederland, 2011) 
<http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/23884/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20re-
port%20EN.pdf?sequence=2> accessed 11 December 2018.
9  Case C-148/13 A, B and C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie ECLI:EU:C:2014:2111, 
Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 32.
10  Case C-199/12 to C-201/12 X, Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:720.
11  Nuno Ferreira and Denise Venturi, Testing the Untestable: The CJEU’s Decision in Case 
C-473/16, F v Bevàndorlàsi és Àllampolgàrsàgi Hivatal (European Database of Asylum 
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2.4 Four types of unacceptable methods of assessment 
In the case A, B and C, the CJEU gave binding guidelines on how 
asylum applications based on sexual orientations should be examined. 
The Court clarifi es that statements of the applicants are a starting point 
for the procedure. Determining authorities are not required to accept 
claims about a certain sexual orientation without further investigation. 
Similarly, just like asylum applications on other grounds, Member States 
are expected to fully and carefully consider the truthfulness of state-
ments and establish the general credibility of the applicants.
The Court states that Member States’ methods of assessment should 
be in conformity with the fundamental rights and freedoms as guaran-
teed by the Charter, more specifi cally respect for human dignity12 and 
the right to private life.13 
At the same time the Court also developed four principles on how 
Member States should adjust their assessment procedures to be in ac-
cordance with Article 4 of Directive 2004/83.14 
Firstly, the CJEU states that: 
assessments based on questioning as to the knowledge on the part of 
the applicant for asylum concerned of organisations for the protection 
of the rights of homosexuals and the details of those organisations, 
such questioning suggests (…) that the authorities base their assess-
ments on stereotyped notions as to the behaviour of homosexuals and 
not on the basis of the specifi c situation of each applicant for asylum.15 
An assessment based on stereotyped notions fails to comply with 
Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/83, requiring Member States to carry out 
assessments that take account of the individual position and personal 
circumstances of the applicant. The Court acknowledges that questions 
Law, 28 June 2018) <http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/testing-untest-
able-cjeu’s-decision-case-c-47316-f-v-bevándorlási-és-állampolgársági-hivatal> accessed 
30 September 2018.
12  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art 1.
13  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art 7.
14  Art 4 of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualifi cation and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or 
as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted [2004] OJ L304/12 contained the requirements for Member States for the assess-
ment of facts and circumstances. At present, the Directive is no longer in force, but Art 4 
was re-adopted verbatim by Art 4 of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards of the qualifi cation of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as benefi ciaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted [2011] OJ L337/9. 
15  A, B and C (n 1) para 60.
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based on stereotyped characteristics may be a useful element at the dis-
posal of competent authorities, but an assessment of applications in grant-
ing refugee status on the basis solely of stereotyped notions associated 
with homosexuals does not satisfy the requirements of the relevant provi-
sions in that it does not allow authorities to take account of the individual 
situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for asylum. When 
an applicant is incapable of answering such questions, the determining 
authority cannot simply decide that the applicant lacks credibility.16
Secondly, the Court fi nds that questions concerning details of the sex-
ual practices of that applicant are contrary to the applicant’s right to re-
spect for private and family life as guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter.17
Thirdly, the Court renounces the use of tests to prove homosexu-
ality or the production of evidence such as fi lms of intimate acts by the 
applicants. Such evidence does not necessarily have probative value, and 
the Court fi nds that such evidence by its nature would infringe human 
dignity as guaranteed by Article 1 of the Charter. National authorities 
allowing homosexual acts to be performed and the submission of the 
applicants to possible ‘tests’ in order to demonstrate their sexuality, or 
the production of fi lms of their intimate acts, are not to be allowed un-
der any circumstances.18 The Court rightly reminds us that allowing or 
authorising such evidence would have the undesirable effect that other 
applicants would feel the need to provide similar evidence and would de 
facto lead to requiring applicants to provide it.19
By including the prohibition of tests or the production of video evi-
dence to prove homosexuality, the Court not only quashes the use of the 
type of evidence that lay at the origin of the case, but also denounces the 
use of so-called ‘phallometric tests’, which were at the time  used in some 
Member States, like the Czech Republic and Slovakia.20 These tests con-
sisted of verifying the physical reaction of gay asylum seekers to hetero-
sexual pornographic material. Only when a person did not show a reaction 
to the visual representations of heterosexual sex were his claims about his 
homosexuality considered proven. Even though widely used in the past, 
these tests were considered highly inaccurate and speculative.21
16  ibid, paras 61-63.
17  ibid, para 64.
18  ibid, para 65.
19  ibid, para 66. 
20  Nikolaj Nielsen, ‘EU Court Strikes Down Gay Asylum Tests’ (EUobserver, 2 December 
2014) <https://euobserver.com/justice/126758> accessed 14 June 2018.
21  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘The Practice of “Phallometric Testing” 
for Gay Asylum Seekers’ (FRA, 9 December 2010) <http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2011/
practice-phallometric-testing-gay-asylum-seekers> accessed 14 June 2018.
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Fourthly, the Court specifi ed that the determining authorities must 
have regard to the sensitive nature of questions relating to a person’s 
personal identity and, in particular, his sexuality. It cannot be concluded 
that an applicant lacks credibility simply because that person did not de-
clare his homosexuality at the outset of his application. Member States 
must make sure that the vulnerability of applicants is taken into ac-
count, together with the personal and general circumstances surround-
ing the application. Reticence in revealing intimate aspects of a person’s 
life cannot entail any negative consequences for his asylum application.22 
3 The CJEU’s view on the use of psychological tests in 
determining asylum seekers sexual orientation
3.1 Circumstances and questions before the Court 
The case23 was brought before the CJEU after F, a Nigerian national 
who claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of 
origin on account of his homosexuality, was denied asylum by the Hun-
garian Offi ce for Immigration and Citizenship. Although his statements 
were not fundamentally contradictory, it was concluded that he lacked 
credibility based on a psychologist’s report that it was not possible to con-
fi rm F’s sexual orientation. It is important to keep in mind that the report 
determined that it was not possible to determine F’s sexual orientation, 
but also did not deny that the applicant was gay. The question arises 
whether providing such proof is even possible. 
The psychological report was based on three different psychological 
tests. Firstly, the ‘Draw-A-Person-In-The-Rain’ test is a personality and 
cognitive test generally used for children and adolescents, making the sub-
ject draw a person in the rain. Depending on different aspects, such as the 
size of the umbrella and the position of the person, psychologists would 
be able to determine personal traits and intelligence. For the Rorschach 
test, the second test, psychologists extract subjects’ perceptions based on 
inkblots. And for the third, the Szondi test, psychologists would be able to 
identify the most important human drive and personality traits by making 
the subject look at eight pictures and have them point out the person they 
would not want to meet after sundown. No questions about sexual habits 
were asked and the applicant was not subjected to a physical examination. 
It is not hard to believe that these tests are generally believed to be inef-
fective in determining sexual orientation or even other personality traits.24
22  A, B and C (n 1), paras 67-71.
23  Case C-473/16 F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal ECLI:EU:C:2018:36.
24  Scott O Lilienfeld, James M. Wood and Howard N. Garb, ‘What’s Wrong with This Pic-
ture?’ (Scientifi c American, May 2001) <www.psychologicalscience.org/newsresearch/pub-
lications/journals/sa1_2.pdf> accessed on 30 September 2018.
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When an applicant has made a genuine effort to provide evidence 
and establish his general credibility, but there is still a lack of evidence 
to substantiate his story, the determining authority should consider the 
benefi t of the doubt. The applicant has the right to enjoy this benefi t 
when no fundamental contradiction in his story can be found.25 Clearly, 
this principle was not applied in F’s case.
After having his asylum application rejected, the applicant appealed 
before the Szeged Administrative Court, which referred several questions 
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The main question was whether 
Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC26 on the assessments of facts 
and circumstances, in the light of Article 1 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, precludes forensic psychologists’ 
expert opinions based on projective personality tests from being used 
in asylum adjudication relating to LGBTQI claimants when such tests 
do not enquire about the applicants’ sexual habits and do not entail a 
physical examination. If this possibility is precluded, the appeal court 
asked whether asylum authorities are prevented from examining with 
these ‘expert methods’ the truthfulness of such international protection 
claims. 
3.2 Relevant legal context
The applicant’s claim was based on the right to private life as 
guaranteed by Article 8(1) ECHR and several other EU law provisions. 
Additionally, the applicant also claimed that the determining author-
ity should be a quasi-judicial or administrative body responsible for 
an appropriate examination of applications for asylum. The Member 
States must ensure that personal interviews allow applicants to pres-
ent the grounds for their applications in a comprehensive manner and 
that personal or general circumstances are considered, including the 
applicant’s cultural origin or vulnerability. The assessment should be 
carried out on an individual basis and should take a multitude of crite-
ria into account (all relevant facts, statements, the individual position, 
personal circumstances, activities and whether the country of origin 
provides protection for the applicant). When assessing if an applicant 
has a well-founded fear of persecution, it is immaterial whether the 
25  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Handbook and Guidelines 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (UNHCR 2011).
26  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qual-
ifi cation and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as per-
sons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
[2004] OJ L304/12.
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applicant actually possesses the characteristic that attracts the per-
secution.27 
Besides, the personnel examining applications and taking decisions 
have the possibility to seek advice from experts, for example for medical, 
cultural, religious and gender issues. An applicant must have the right 
to an effective remedy against a decision that denies refugee status or 
similar subsidiary protection.28
3.3 LGBTQI rights in Nigeria 
It is easy to say that LGBTQI rights in Nigeria do not exist. Sections 
215-217 of the Nigerian Criminal Code Act, together with the 2013 Same-
Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, criminalises ‘acts against the order of 
nature’ committed by people who have sexual relations with a person of 
the same sex. The maximum penalty is 14 years of imprisonment. 
In the northern parts of Nigeria, LGBTQI people are treated even 
worse. Shari’a law is applicable and criminalises sexual acts between 
people of the same sex. The maximum penalty for these activities be-
tween men is the death penalty by stoning, whereas the maximum pen-
alty for women is whipping and/or imprisonment.29
These circumstances need to be taken into account when assessing 
an asylum application based on sexual orientation. The fact that there 
was no reference to this information in F’s case is alarming.
3.4 Judgment
The CJEU fi rst takes the relevant legal provisions into account and 
acknowledges that the determining authorities should have regard for 
the context and circumstances. There is no doubt that having a sexual 
orientation can constitute membership of a particular social group that 
is perceived by the surrounding society as being different and therefore 
can possibly be considered a threat. It is important that the CJEU also 
considers that it does not actually matter whether the applicant identi-
27  Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ 
L326/13, Arts 2(e), 4(1), 8(2), 10(2), 13(3).
28  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] OJ 
L180/60, Art 10(3), 46(1).
29  Aengus Carroll and Lucas Ramón Mendos, ‘State-sponsored Homophobia − A World Sur-
vey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition’ (ILGA, 2017 
<https://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf> 
accessed 30 September 2018.
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fi es with the social group that attracts persecution. The Court stressed 
that it is possible for a person to be considered a member of a particular 
social group when the characteristic is simply attributed to the person 
by the actor(s) of the persecution. It is therefore not always even nec-
essary to assess the applicant’s sexual orientation, since it is possible 
that non-heterosexual orientation is simply attributed or perceived by 
the surrounding society of the applicant.30 
Expert reports should, however, not be excluded from the process of 
assessment to determine the applicant’s actual need for asylum or other 
protection and can even prove to be useful. Nevertheless, the procedures 
used by the determining authorities should be in line with EU law and 
respect any applicant’s fundamental rights and freedoms, more specifi -
cally Article 1 (human dignity), Article 7 (right to respect for private and 
family life) and Article 47 (right to effective remedy) of the EU Charter. 
Moreover, it is for these determining authorities alone to examine and 
decide on asylum applications. They cannot be bound, either de facto or 
de lege, by conclusions from expert reports relating to sexual orientation. 
National determining authorities are to take ultimate responsibility for 
an individual and in concreto assessment of the situation and cannot put 
this responsibility onto (psychological) experts.31
The CJEU found interference with the applicant’s private life, and 
states that such interference should be proportionate, ie the measures 
should not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the le-
gitimate objectives pursued by legislation. The determining authorities 
should assess whether psychologists’ reports are appropriate and nec-
essary after considering the individual circumstances. The Court found 
that it is apparent that the seriousness of the interference in this case 
exceeded what was needed to assess the applicant’s fear of persecution. 
It goes on to stress that national authorities should focus on provid-
ing the necessary training and skills for asylum case workers to assess 
all personal circumstances in asylum applications, including matters of 
sexual orientation.32
Advocate General Wahl had already raised the importance of con-
sent in examining asylum applications in his Opinion. Wahl states that 
an applicant should have suffi cient knowledge of psychological examina-
tions and that a refusal to undergo these tests should be respected.33 The 
CJEU adds that a refusal to undergo such examinations, when care is 
30  F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal (n 23) paras 31-32.
31  ibid, para 40-42.
32  ibid, para 66-67.
33  Case C-473/16 F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal ECLI:EU:C:2017:739, Opin-
ion of AG Wahl, para 43.
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taken to respect the applicant’s private life and human dignity, may have 
certain negative consequences.34 This is a very disturbing declaration 
from the Court, especially taking into account that asylum applicants 
already undergo the inevitable pressure to undergo any tests. In my 
opinion, an applicant’s refusal to undergo any psychological or other test 
should not have any negative consequences on establishing his general 
credibility, provided that the applicant is otherwise cooperative and will-
ing to provide evidence of his individual circumstances. Other authors 
agree that when an asylum seeker refuses to participate in a test with no 
probative value, this may lead to the refusal of their application, which is 
considered a highly disproportionate and unfair outcome.35
Making a fi nal judgment based on the above-mentioned reasons, 
the CJEU acknowledges the considerations that ILGA-Europe and oth-
er similar human rights NGOs have been making for years.36 When an 
applicant’s statement is consistent and plausible, and the applicant gen-
uinely tries to substantiate his application, it may not be necessary to 
actually determine or confi rm the applicant’s sexuality. When an asylum 
applicant is cooperative and gives a valid and satisfactory explanation 
for any lack of material evidence for some elements of his circumstances, 
the applicant should be granted international protection at the earliest 
possible time. 
The issue remaining is that the Court still does not offer any positive 
guidelines as to how the national determining authorities should deal 
with evidence, and it still does not recognise the importance of self-de-
clared sexual orientation by asylum applicants.37 Unfortunately, the 
Court remains careful and refrains from giving stricter guidelines, but 
34  F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal (n 23) paras 52-53.
35  Nuno Ferreira and Denise Venturi, ‘Tell Me What You See and I’ll Tell You If You’re Gay: 
Analysing the Advocate-General’s Opinion in Case C-473/16 F v Bevándorlási és Állampol-
gársági Hivatal’ (EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 24 November 2017) <http://
eumigrationlawblog.eu/tell-me-what-you-see-and-ill-tell-you-if-youre-gay-analysing-the-
advocate-generals-opinion-in-case-c-47316-f-v-bevandorlasi-es-allampolgarsagi-hivatal/> 
accessed 30 September 2018. 
36  Sabine Jansen, ‘Good Practices’ (ILGA Europe, 2014) <www.refworld.org/pd-
fi d/5433a8124.pdf> accessed 18 June 2018. Already in May 2014, ILGA-Europe released 
a report stating that they ‘acknowledge that LGBTI asylum authorities need to assess the 
general credibility of an applicant’s story in relation to the well-foundedness of the fear of 
persecution. However, this assessment differs from testing one’s sexual orientation or gen-
der identity. ILGA-Europe is of the opinion that the assessment should acknowledge the 
self-identifi cation of the person concerned and focus on the persecution this person has 
experienced or fears’.
37  Nuno Ferreira and Denise Venturi, ‘Testing the Untestable: The CJEU’s Decision in 
Case C-473/16, F v Bevàndorlàsi és Àllampolgàrsàgi Hivatal’ (European Database of Asy-
lum Law, 28 June 2018) <http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/testing-untest-
able-cjeu’s-decision-case-c-47316-f-v-bevándorlási-és-állampolgársági-hivatal> accessed 
30 September 2018.
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overall tries to promote fair and lawful asylum decision-making proce-
dures throughout the EU. In my opinion, however, it is time for the Court 
to establish more stringent rules for national determining authorities. 
But in order for it to do so, the national courts requesting preliminary 
rulings must shape their questions in such a way that they give the 
Court the possibility to do this. Domestic courts currently have a wide 
margin of appreciation in this matter, but it can be argued that it is un-
wise to offer domestic authorities such leeway in asylum cases based on 
sexual orientation since there is generally no correct assessment.38
4 What next?
4.1 A strategy to shape the future of sexual orientation asylum 
cases in the EU
There are three aspects that are important in shaping the future 
of determining sexual asylum claims: training, guidance, and quality 
control. The combination of these three aspects are the only way for-
ward to optimise asylum assessment throughout the European Union 
and provide adequate protection to the applicants that need internation-
al protection.
Firstly, training is an important tool for determining authorities to 
correctly assess all types of asylum claims. It provides caseworkers with 
a sound base of experience and gives them the knowledge, tools, attitude 
and practical skills to adequately assess the applicant’s situation.39 The 
topic remains a complex and diffi cult area and sexual orientation remains 
a sensitive issue. Caseworkers applying correct and sensible training can 
make a difference at all stages of the asylum application assessment. 
Secondly, the importance and involvement of (LGBTQI) refugees 
should not be underestimated. Former and current refugees and sexual 
orientation experts can provide the necessary guidance to help deter-
mining authorities to address the needs of LGBTQI asylum seekers more 
effectively. They can offer this advice and guidance in a comprehensive 
and effective way.40 It is important to offer more than just prescriptive 
38  Ferreira and Venturi (n 35).
39  ORAM, ‘Training on Sexual and Gender Minorities: What Refugee Professions Need to 
Know and Do’ (ORAM, 2015) <http://oramrefugee.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
Sample-Training-Slides-English.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018.
40  US Citizen and Immigration Services, ‘Guidance for Adjudicating Lesbian, Gay, Bisex-
ual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Refugee and Asylum Claims’ (US Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011) <www.uscis.gov/sites/default/fi les/USCIS/Humanitarian/Ref-
ugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/Asylum%20Native%20Documents%20and%20Stat-
ic%20Files/RAIO-Training-March-2012.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. 
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lists and questions, but also to give positive guidance to establish what 
aspects should be discussed and how interviews should be conducted to 
provide optimal protection for the people who need it.
Finally, a reliable quality control system would greatly benefi t the 
determining authorities across the European Union and provide case-
workers to learn from the best practices of others. This would allow the 
identifi cation of inappropriate evidentiary practices and make sure these 
authorities can improve their assessment techniques.41
It should no longer be the case that LGBTQI asylum seekers feel 
that they are expected to present themselves in a certain way to fi t more 
into the global LGBTQI image.42 The above-mentioned training, guidance 
and control could make the difference in many asylum seekers cases. 
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that sexual orientation is a complex 
matter and is deeply entwined with the identity of an applicant. There-
fore, an assessment should take place with respect for the right to private 
life, as guaranteed by Article 7.43
4.2 Analysis of F’s case
The CJEU obviously values an in concreto assessment of every asy-
lum application. Expert (psychological) reports can be used in assess-
ing an applicant’s credibility and personal circumstances. These tests 
should, however, respect EU law and every applicant’s fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Such reports can only give an indication of sexual 
orientation. When the authorities base their decision solely on expert 
reports, it shows an improper examination of the applications since no 
weight is given to other factors or an applicant’s general credibility.
It is now up to the Hungarian authorities to further decide on F’s 
case. Logically, they will not only have to consider the recent judgment of 
the CJEU, but they will also have to have consideration for the previous 
case law by applying both the social recognition test and the fundamen-
tal characteristic test.44
41 John Vine, ‘An Investigation into the Home Offi ce’s Handling of Asylum Claims Made 
on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation March-June 2014’ (Independent Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration, 2014) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547330/Investigation-into-the-Han-
dling-of-Asylum-Claims_Oct_2014.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. 
42  Johannes Lukas Gartner, (In)credibly Queer: Sexuality-Based Asylum in the European 
Union (Humanity in Action 2015).
43  A, B and C, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 9) para 38.
44  X, Y and Z (n 10).
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The social recognition test entails that the Hungarian Appeals Court 
will need to check F’s membership of a group socially recognisable in the 
country of origin. Obviously, the Appeals Court will need to consider the 
specifi c circumstances of the case. Then, there is also an abundance of 
information on the treatment of LGBTQI people in Nigeria that needs to 
be taken into account by the Court.45 
Secondly, the fundamental characteristic test requires the recognition 
of a certain sexual identity as a characteristic so fundamental to a person’s 
identity that the persons concerned should not have to renounce it. 
5 Conclusion
It seems that even now the Court refrains from providing more guid-
ance on how Member States should be assessing asylum claims based 
on sexual orientation. There is a desperate need for clearer guidelines 
on how asylum applications should be assessed, and especially in the 
case of LGBTQI applicants. While the European legislation lags behind 
in fi lling these legal gaps, this case was an excellent opportunity for the 
CJEU to further develop more binding principles for Member States, and 
by extension for their determining authorities.
There is no doubt, however, that the CJEU’s decision will have an 
impact on all Member States and their asylum examination procedures. 
As the above-mentioned examples of other Member States show, there is 
still a lot of work to do.
It is, however, refreshing to see that some Member States are pick-
ing up on this individual approach and are encouraging their immigra-
tion offi cers to be considerate of gender-specifi c issues and individual 
circumstances.46 The CJEU also considers that it does not matter wheth-
er an applicant actually identifi es as homosexual. What matters is how 
the applicant is perceived by the surrounding society and the potential 
consequences that perception may have for his or her physical integrity, 
which can be the grounds for a well-founded fear of persecution. The 
determining authorities should be assessing the general credibility and 
circumstances of an applicant instead of trying to determine the actual 
sexual orientation. 
Overall, the CJEU has again highlighted some important aspects of 
how asylum applications based on sexual orientation should be consid-
45  For example, in Carroll and Mendos (n 29).
46  See, for example, UK Home Offi ce, ‘Staff Guide on Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim’ 
(UK Home Offi ce, 10 April 2018) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/699703/gender-issues-in-the-asylum-
claim-v3.pdf> accessed 20 May 2018.
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ered, providing the various determining authorities in all Member States 
with a clearer vision on how they should conduct these assessments. 
It appears, however, that the use of (psychological) tests in these 
assessments remains controversial. This becomes apparent when com-
paring the Opinion of AG Wahl in the case at hand and AG Sharpston’s 
Opinion in A, B and C, in which the latter stated: 
Since homosexuality is not a medical condition, any purported medical 
test applied to determine an applicant’s sexual orientation could not, in 
my view, be considered to be consistent with Article 3 of the Charter. It 
would also fail the proportionality requirement (Article 52(1)) in relation 
to a violation of the right to privacy and family life because, by defi ni-
tion, such a test cannot achieve the objective of establishing an individ-
ual’s sexual orientation. It follows that medical tests cannot be used for 
the purpose of establishing an applicant’s credibility, as they infringe 
Articles 3 and 7 of the Charter. […] Even if an applicant consents to any 
of the three practices (medical examinations, intrusive questioning, or 
providing explicit evidence), such consent does not change my analysis. 
The applicant’s consent to a medical test for something (homosexuality) 
that is not a recognised medical condition (i) cannot remedy a violation 
of Article 3 of the Charter, (ii) would not increase the probative value of 
any evidence obtained and (iii) cannot render such a limitation of the 
rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter proportionate for the pur-
poses of Article 52(1). Furthermore, I also entertain serious doubts as 
to whether an applicant, who is the vulnerable party in the procedure 
of applying for refugee status, could really be deemed to have given ful-
ly free and informed consent to the competent national authorities in 
such circumstances.47 
It occurs to me that the Court can do better and has an import-
ant role in shaping future assessments of refugee applications. It should 
consider taking bolder and more daring positions, like the Opinion of 
AG Sharpston, in order to better protect refugees across the European 
Union. May the Court fi nd the will and strength to do so in the next case!
Unfortunately, the political climate in Hungary does not seem to 
show a welcoming climate for refugees at all. A recent refl ection of this 
evolution was made painfully clear in the light of the UN Migration Pact. 
The Pact was adopted in Marrakech on 10 December 2018 and voted for 
by the UN General Assembly on 19 December in New York. The Pact gath-
ered an overwhelming 152 votes in favour with only 5 countries voting 
against. Nevertheless, the political climate in the majority of countries 
was divided in the weeks running up to the gathering in Marrakech. 
Hungary was one of the fi rst countries to offi cially state that it would not 
47  A, B and C, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 9), paras 61 and 67.
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sign the Pact. Previously, Hungary expressed its opposition to refugee 
quotas, designed to share the burden of Mediterranean countries such 
as Italy, Greece and Spain, where most immigrants from Turkey, Syria 
and African countries arrive. This stance was sadly followed by Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Austria and also made other countries doubt 
whether or not to sign the UN Migration Pact. The reluctance to sign 
even a non-binding instrument is appalling and is typical of the current 
political climate. We can only hope that the efforts of human rights or-
ganisations, the CJEU, and all those working with migrants and refu-
gees are not in vain, and that we can continue to grow towards a more 
understanding European Union.
